Over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms, but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly. I provide an explanation for this poor performance. In my model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner. These choices affect domestic production and aid inflows. Production is high when productive capacity is high, and when the policy is appropriate in the country-specific circumstances and implemented honestly. Aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm. In equilibrium countries with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions follow the paradigm more closely. Hence my model suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries that would fail anyway.
Introduction
Development economists and international development agencies have advocated very different development paradigms since World War II. The paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s
suggested that governments should take the leading role in development: they should adopt import substitution policies and plan the accumulation and allocation of capital. But Krueger (1995) and others argue that many developing countries following this paradigm, for example those in Latin America, performed rather poorly, while some other countries like South Korea and Taiwan were growing fast with different policies.
The paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, the "Washington Consensus", suggested that markets should be given the leading role in development: industries should be deregulated, public enterprizes privatized and trade liberalized. But Rodrik (2006) and others argue that many developing countries following this paradigm, for example again those in Latin America, performed rather poorly despite the support they received from international development agencies, while some other countries like China and India were growing fast with different policies.
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Besides these two major development paradigms, many other ideas and paradigms have also been far less successful in promoting economic development than initially expected.
Reviewing various development policies popular at some point in time since World War II, Easterly (2001, book cover) concludes that "[a] myriad of remedies has not delivered the solutions promised." The limited success of the various development paradigms also manifests itself in the disappointing finding that foreign aid has no robust positive effect on economic development (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 ).
The question arises way all these development paradigms have failed in various countries. In principle, it could be that all these paradigms were wrong, but that there is a 1 The success of these two major development paradigms is subject to an intense and sometimes ideologyladen discussion. For a thorough and insightful discussion, see, e.g., Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) .
"true" development paradigm out there waiting to be discovered. However, many development economists have recently emphasized that it is unlikely that a simple set of policies can trigger development universally, and that appropriate policies differ across countries as they depend on cultural, historical and institutional circumstances (e.g., Lindauer and Pritchett, 2002; Mukand and Rodrik, 2005; Rodrik, 2006 Rodrik, , 2007 Rodrik, , 2010 Rajan 2008 ). 2 In this paper I take the notion that appropriate policies differ across developing countries as a starting point, and I show that countries that would preform poorly anyway because of their poor economic and institutional pre-conditions tend to follow development paradigms more closely. This argument suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they attract countries that would fail anyway.
I present my argument using a simple two-period political economy model inspired by Mukand and Rodrik (2005) , and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) . I follow the former in modeling country-specific optimal policies and corruption, and the latter in modeling political competition and institutions. 3 In my model the incumbent president of a developing country chooses a policy, e.g., the degree of government interventions, and decides whether to implement this policy in an honest or corrupt manner. These choices affect the two components of national income: domestic production and aid inflows. Domestic production is high when productive capacity is high, and when the policy is appropriate in the country-specific circumstances and implemented in an honest manner. Aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the current development paradigm. At the end of the first period the incumbent may be replaced by the challenger. The chances that the incumbent can stay in office depend on the quality of the political institutions, and on whether the people support him or his challenger, knowing that any politician could be inherently good 2 The theory of the second best suggests that optimal policies should differ across developing countries if binding constraints differ across developing countries, which seems likely. 3 The foci of these two contributions are quite different from mine: Mukand and Rodrik (2005) study policy experimentation and imitation in a setting with multiple countries, and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) look at how the effect of natural resource rents on corruption depends on political institutions.
(i.e., benevolent) or bad (i.e., corrupt). In the second period the politician in office again chooses a policy and decides whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner.
In equilibrium the people support the incumbent if and only if he chooses the optimal policy and implements it in an honest manner. A good incumbent always does so, but a bad incumbent does so only if the political institutions are sufficiently strong, such that he is likely to stay in office if and only if the people decide to support him. If the political institutions are relatively weak, a bad incumbent chooses a policy closer to the paradigm and implements it in a corrupt manner. Moreover, the chosen policy is in any case the closer to the paradigm, the lower the productive capacity. Hence countries that would perform poorly anyway due low productivity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions tend to follow the paradigm more closely than countries with high productivity and no corruption. In an extension I further show that if the paradigm reveals some information about the policies that could be appropriate, then ignorant politicians follow the paradigm more closely than politicians who know the appropriate policy themselves.
Therefore development paradigms may be doomed to fail because they attract countries that are doomed to fail.
This model also provides an explanation for the absence of a robust positive effect of foreign aid on economic development. It suggests that countries receive more aid when following the paradigm closely, and that such countries tend to be plagued by low productivity, weak political institutions and distorted policies that are inappropriate in the country-specific circumstances.
There are many contributions that argue why some particular development paradigm has failed. But to the best of my knowledge, my model is the first that offers an explanation why all development paradigms have a tendency to fail or, at least, to look as if they failed.
It is thereby related to other models that illustrate the (mostly negative) incentive effects of foreign aid, e.g., those on foreign aid and rent seeking by Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2007) . The most closely related contributions is probably Hagen (2008) showing that aid recipient countries have an incentive to tilt their policies towards the donors' preferred policies (i.e., towards the current paradigm) even if aid is disbursed unconditionally.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and derives the main results. Section 4 introduces uncertainty into the model. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains lengthy proofs.
The Model
There is a developing country with three players: the incumbent president, who is in power for exogenous reasons, a challenger and the people. Each politician, i.e., the incumbent and the challenger, is a good type with probability β ∈ (0, 1) and a bad type with probability 1 − β. 4 Each politician's type is his private information, but β is common knowledge. At the end of period one, the people observe κ 1 , but not a 1 , and they support either the incumbent or the challenger. 5 I assume that they support the incumbent when indifferent.
The political institutions determine the extent to which the people's decision affects the probability that the incumbent is replaced by the challenger. The incumbent can remain in office with probability p if the people support him, and with probability q if the people support the challenger, where 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1. Following Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010),
I measure the quality of the political institutions by D ≡ p − q. This measure suggests that political institutions are of high quality when the incumbent is likely to stay in office if and only if the people want him to stay, but of low quality when the people's decision has little effect on the chances that the incumbent can stay in office. 6 In period two the politician in office chooses policy a 2 ∈ [0, 1] and corruption κ 2 ∈ {0, c}.
In each period there are two sources of national income y t : domestic production and aid inflows. Domestic production increases in the productive capacity A > 0; and due to disincentive effects it is lower in the presence of corruption (κ t = c) than in the absence of it (κ t = 0). Domestic production also depends on how close the chosen policy a t is to the policy z ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes production in the country-specific circumstances. For now, I assume that politicians know z. 7 Aid inflows depend on the donors' generosity B > 0 and the closeness of policy a t to the development paradigm x ∈ [0, 1]. The idea is that donors reward aid recipient countries that follow the current paradigm, either by allocating (i.e., promising) more aid to these countries, or by disbursing a higher fraction of the allocated aid to these countries. 8 Formally, I assume
where Λ(0) = A and Λ(c) = ϕA with A > 0 and ϕ ∈ (0, 1), and where f (a t |z) and g(a t |x)
are strictly positive and continuously differentiable with f
The choices of the politician in office determine his official wage
, and the 6 Aidt et al. (2008) also use this measure of political institutions in their retrospective voting framework. They focus on the two different types of weak political institutions that this formulation allows for: If p and q are both high, an authoritarian incumbent is likely to stay in office even without the people's support. If they are both low, the incumbent is likely to be overthrown even when the people support him. 7 The subsequent results do not depend on whether or not the people know z. 8 The model can therefore capture a main determinant of aid flows even if aid conditionality rarely works, as long as more aid is generally allocated to countries following the current development paradigm than to countries choosing very different policies (e.g., central planning in the early 1990s). See also Hagen (2008).
people's welfare u t = u(a t , κ t ) = (1 − τ − κ t )y(a t , κ t ). In each period the people's payoff is u t , the payoff of a good politician in office is w t , the payoff of a bad politician in office is w t + r t , and the payoff of a politician out of office is zero. Hence good and bad politicians differ in that bad politicians value corruption revenues and the official wage equally, while good politicians only derive utility from their official wage. For simplicity, I abstract from discounting. Further, I assume The appropriate solution concept for my dynamic game of incomplete information is perfect Bayesian equilibria, and I focus on pure-strategy equilibria that satisfy the ChoKreps intuitive criterion. I use the abbreviation PBE to stand for perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies that satisfy the intuitive criterion.
The Equilibrium
I start by discussing the combinations of policies a t and corruption κ t that a politician in office may choose. As the payoff of any politician in office increases in the national income That is, politicians always choose a policy in-between the production maximizing policy z and the aid maximizing paradigm x. The chosen policy is closer to the paradigm in the presence of corruption, and if the country's productive capacity A is low. The reason is that in these cases productivity is low anyway, such that more can be gained by appealing to international donors than by choosing policies that slightly increase productivity in the country-specific circumstances.
I now solve the game using backward induction, therefore starting with the policy choices of the politician who is in office in period two: Having derived the equilibrium strategies, we can now study the characteristics of the countries that tend to follow the paradigm closely. I thereby use the expected distance E(|a 1 − x|) to measure how closely a country follows the paradigm. Proposition 1 implies that the expected distance is simply E(|a 1 − x|) = |a 0 − x| if political institutions are so
follows from Lemma 1:
Proposition 2 The expected distance E(|a 1 − x|) increases in A and decreases in B, and it is higher if D ≥ D ′ than otherwise.
In other words, developing countries tend to follow the paradigm closely if productive capacity A is low, if aid tends to be generous (high B), and if political institutions D are so weak that bad incumbents do not feel sufficiently constrained to refrain from corruption.
It is easy to show that the expected national income E(y 1 ) would be small in countries with low A and low D even in the absence of a paradigm and foreign aid, i.e., even if B = 0. Together with Proposition 2, this finding implies that development paradigms have a natural tendency to fail because countries that would perform poorly anyway -due to low productive capacity and poor political institutions -tend to follow the paradigms more closely.
Adding Uncertainty
In the previous sections I have looked at a situation in which politicians know the policy z that maximizes domestic production in the country-specific circumstances. In this section I first show that the main results of the previous section also hold if the politicians do not know z, i.e., if they are ignorant. I then add the assumption that the development paradigm x reveals some information about the distribution of z. I find that in this case countries with ignorant politicians follow the paradigm more closely than countries with informed politicians.
I assume that policy z is drawn from the distribution H 1 (z) with probability γ ∈ (0, 1), and from the distribution H 2 (z) with probability 1 − γ, where H 1 (0) = H 2 (0) = 0 and
, and where the corresponding densities h 1 (z) and h 2 (z) are continuously differentiable. Since I will again focus on the expected distance E(|a 1 − x|), I can assume without loss of generality that the politicians learn z at the beginning of period two.
Suppose for now that when choosing policy bundle (a 1 , κ 1 ), the incumbent has no information about z other than probability γ and the distributions H 1 (z) and H 2 (z). From his perspective the distribution of z is thus I now add the assumptions that z is drawn from H 1 (z), and that the paradigm is x =z 1 ,
f (a t |z)h 1 (z)dz again being continuously differentiable, concave and hump-shaped. These assumptions may represent a situation in which donors have some knowledge about country-specific optimal polices and set the paradigm to maximize expected production in the recipient country.
The fact that the paradigm x reveals the true distribution of z does not provide any additional valuable information to an incumbent who is informed and knows the countryspecific optimal policy z. He therefore still chooses the policy a 1 specified in Proposition
′′ (a t |z) < 0 for all a t and z.
1, which generally differs from x. However, if the incumbent is ignorant, then information about the distribution of z is valuable for him. In particular, when x =z 1 , an ignorant incumbent can simultaneously maximize expected domestic production and aid inflows by choosing policy a 1 = x. Hence, unlike an informed incumbent, an ignorant incumbent follows the paradigm very closely (no matter whether he is good or bad). Therefore:
lower if the incumbent is ignorant than if he knows z.
There are two important differences between the results in Propositions 2 and 3. First, low productive capacity A and weak political institutions D tend to lead to policies close to the paradigm x independently of how the paradigm has been determined. Ignorance, however, only causes incumbents to closely follow the paradigm if doing so increases expected domestic production. If the paradigm is set randomly, or if it reflects ideological views, then it becomes ambiguous whether an informed or an ignorant incumbent follows the paradigm more closely. Second, low productive capacity and weak political institutions lead to policies close to the paradigm because such policies generate higher aid inflows. But when the paradigm maximizes expected domestic production, ignorant politicians would follow the paradigm more closely than informed politicians even if foreign aid were paid independently of the chosen policy.
It is easy to show that countries with an ignorant incumbent would perform worse in expectation than countries with an informed incumbent also in the absence of a paradigm and foreign aid. Proposition 3 thus suggests another reason why paradigms may fail: they may attract countries that would perform poorly anyway because of their incompetent politicians. But despite their poor performance, these countries still perform better than if the paradigm did not reveal any information about the appropriate policies z. A paradigm that reveals valuable information therefore simultaneously helps countries with ignorant politicians, and looks like a failure as most countries that follow it perform poorly.
Concluding Remarks
The presented model suggests that many developing countries may be willing to distort their policies to follow a certain development paradigm in order to attract higher aid flows. The model suggests that development paradigms might retard development by motivating political leaders to distort their policies away from the policies that would be appropriate in the country-specific circumstances. What might seem even worse is that paradigms cause larger policy distortions in countries with low productivity and poor governance. This, however, is not unambiguously negative, as it implies higher aid flows to countries in which the people's welfare is low. Paradigms could thus be seen as a mechanism, albeit imperfect, that ensures that more aid flows to countries where people are in need. In addition, paradigms can also do good when used to reveal valuable information about appropriate policies to incompetent political leaders.
There is disagreement about what development paradigm, if any, has followed the Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2006) . Some would say that the focus on governance and corruption is the new development paradigm. This focus is quite different from the policy paradigms discussed in this paper. Thinking within the presented framework, such a paradigm may mean that foreign aid is independent of the chosen policy, but higher when the policy is implemented in an honest rather than a corrupt manner. As a result (good and bad) politicians have no incentive to distort policies, and even bad politicians may often find it optimal to implement these undistorted policies in an honest manner.
But, in countries with very poor political institutions, bad politicians may still engage in massive corruption. 10 As a result these countries receive less foreign aid. Hence, the effects of such a governance paradigm contrasts starkly with the effects of policy paradigms: First, countries where people are in need tend to receive more aid under a policy paradigm, but less aid under a governance paradigm. Second, a governance paradigm may look successful partly because its followers would perform quite well anyway, while policy paradigms tend to look unsuccessful partly because they attract mainly countries that would fail anyway. 
Appendix B (not intended for publication)
In this appendix I assume that foreign aid no longer depends on policy a t , but on corruption κ t . In particular, I assume that aid inflows are given by Bg(κ t ), withg(0) >g(c) ≥ 0. The rest of the model is the same as in section 2.
In any period the politician in office simply chooses the policy a t = z, which maximizes national income y t and, thereby, his official wage w t , and also the corruption revenues r t if κ t = c. 11 Hence, it is only corruption κ t ∈ {0, c} that is of interest in this setting.
In period two a good incumbent again chooses κ 2 = 0, which leads to the national , and κ 2 = c otherwise. .
In this case the PBE of this modified game is the same as the PBE characterized in 11 In the presence of uncertainty as in section 4, the incumbent would choose the policy a t that maximizes expected national income, but all subsequent results would be very similar.
12 Depending ong(0) andg(c), this inequality can hold even though , where the first inequality holds by assumption and the second follows from Lemma 1.
